People v. Branch: Testing the Limits of Judicial Discretion in Allowing Midtestimony Conferences by Shavitz, Ian A.
Pace Law Review
Volume 16
Issue 2 Winter 1996
Tribute--Vincent L. Broderick
Article 10
January 1996
People v. Branch: Testing the Limits of Judicial
Discretion in Allowing Midtestimony Conferences
Ian A. Shavitz
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Ian A. Shavitz, People v. Branch: Testing the Limits of Judicial Discretion in Allowing Midtestimony
Conferences, 16 Pace L. Rev. 287 (1996)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol16/iss2/10
Note
People v. Branch: Testing the Limits of
Judicial Discretion in Allowing
Midtestimony Conferences
I. Introduction ....................................... 288
II. Background ........................................ 289
A. Purpose of a trial and the role of the judge in
effectuating that purpose ....................... 289
B. Alternatives to a Private Meeting Between
Attorney and Witness .......................... 296
1. Meeting where judge is present ............. 296
2. Impeachment of witness by the party who
called him .................................. 297
3. Refreshing the memory of a witness ........ 299
C. Fearful Witnesses .............................. 299
D. Appropriate Role of Appellate Courts .......... 301
E. Approaches of other jurisdictions ............... 303
III. People v. Branch ................................... 307
A. The Facts ...................................... 307
B. Procedural History ............................. 309
C. M ajority Opinion ............................... 310
D. Dissenting Opinion ............................ 312
IV . Analysis ........................................... 315
A. Majority Opinion and Its Rationale ............ 315
B. Appropriate Standard of Review ............... 319
1. Permissible Scope of Review Suggested by
the Dissent ................................. 319
2. The "Necessity" Standard ................... 319
C. The Standard of Review Which Emerged ....... 321
V . Conclusion ......................................... 323
1
PACE LAW REVIEW
I. Introduction
A criminal trial does not unfold like a play with actors following a
script; there is no scenario and can be none. The trial judge must
meet situations as they arise and to do this must have broad
power to cope with the complexities and contingencies inherent in
the adversary process.'
People v. Branch2 exemplifies the truth inherent in Chief
Justice Burger's statement in Geders v. United States,3 which
permitted a midtestimony conference between counsel for a de-
fendant and a testifying defendant. 4 Eighteen years later, the
Geder's ruling became the basis for upholding a far different re-
sult; a midtestimony conference between a non-defendant wit-
ness and a prosecutor.5
In People v. Branch,6 the New York Court of Appeals set
parameters which ultimately determined when a judge may al-
low a prosecutor to hold a "brief private conference" 7 with a wit-
ness during direct examination.8 The court held, in this case of
first impression in New York, that the decision to permit this
type of conference is within the broad discretion of the trial
judge.9
In Branch, Lushon Josephs was shot and killed inside his
apartment.10 Thomas Edwards, a key witness for the prosecu-
tion, stated to police and testified before the Grand Jury that he
saw the defendant enter and leave Josephs' apartment,
armed.1 ' On direct examination, however, the witness testified
inconsistently with his prior testimony.12 After a bench confer-
ence, the trial judge allowed the prosecutor to briefly confer
with the witness.13 The issue presented in Branch was whether
1. Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 86 (1976).
2. 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1994).
3. 425 U.S. at 80.
4. 425 U.S. at 91.
5. See Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 663, 634 N.E.2d at 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
6. 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365 (1994).
7. Id. at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
8. Id. at 666-67, 634 N.E.2d at 967-68, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366-67.
9. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 663, 634 N.E.2d at 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 365.
10. Id. at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
11. Id. at 665-66, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
12. Id. at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d 366.
13. Id. at 665-66, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
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the trial court abused its discretion when it allowed a private
meeting between the prosecutor and the witness. 14 The New
York Court of Appeals held that where a witness allegedly com-
mitted perjury on the stand, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion if the alleged perjury impaired the truth-seeking
function of the trial.15
Part II of this casenote examines the basic purpose of a
trial and the judge's role in effectuating that purpose. The limi-
tations on a trial judge's discretion are explored along with an
appellate court's power to review such discretionary decisions.
Additionally, Part II explores various alternatives to midtes-
timony conferences which continue to uphold the truth-seeking
functions of the trial. Finally, Part II provides several instances
where the court has allowed a private meeting between a wit-
ness and attorney.
Part III discusses the factual background of People v.
Branch, the procedural history prior to the New York Court of
Appeals opinion, and the majority and dissenting opinions.
Part IV analyzes the propriety of the court's decision and ra-
tionale. This Note concludes that although the court's reason-
ing was improper, it reached the correct result.
II. Background
A. Purpose of a trial and the role of the judge in effectuating
that purpose.
The right to a fair trial is recognized as a cornerstone of our
system of jurisprudence.' 6 In general, a trial resolves both fac-
tual and legal disputes.' 7 In the realm of factual disputes, the
14. Id. at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
15. Id. at 667-68, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
16. The basis of our system ofjurisprudence is the United States Constitution.
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution, guaranteeing a fair trial, states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury ... and to be informed of the nature
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to
have the assistance of counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
17. A trial is defined as: "A judicial examination, in accordance with law of the
land, of a cause, either civil or criminal, of the issues between the parties, whether
law or fact, before a court that has proper jurisdiction." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY
2891996]
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purpose of a trial is truth-seeking. 8 This is especially true in
criminal trials where a conviction may justly deprive a person of
his or her liberty or property. 19
The ability of the trial process to elicit the truth is not self-
executing; there are many devices and processes within the
trial which facilitate this function.20 To be most effective, some-
one must manage these devices and processes. The trial judge
is charged with this responsibility.21 In fulfilling this responsi-
bility, the goal of ascertaining the truth must always be of para-
mount concern. 22
Certain matters require the judge, as manager of the trial,
to make discretionary decisions. Complicating these discretion-
ary decisions is the absence of an applicable governing statute
or law.23 A judge, therefore, must base these decisions on rea-
son, always realizing the ultimate goal; justice.24 It is difficult
to ascertain a precise definition of "judicial discretion" due to
the term's abstract nature. 25 The Washington Court of Appeals,
1504 (6th ed. 1990). See also AMERCAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1292 (2d ed. 1982).
"The examination of evidence and applicable law by a competent tribunal to deter-
mine the issue of specified charges or claims." Id.
18. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965). The United States Supreme
Court held that "[clourt proceedings are held for the solemn purpose of endeavor-
ing to ascertaining the truth which is the sine qua non of a fair trial." Id. at 540.
19. WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JERALD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, at 34 (2d ed.
1992). "The discovery of truth is an essential goal of any criminal justice process
that is to serve the ends of the substantive criminal law through the effective en-
forcement of the law." Id. at 33.
20. Some of these devices and processes include, but are not limited to, calling
witnesses, presenting evidence to a jury, and implementing rules of procedure.
21. The judge is defined as an officer "appointed to preside and administer the
law in a court of justice; the chief member of a court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY,
841 (6th ed. 1990). See also RENZO D. BOWERS, JUDICIAL DISCRETION OF TRIAL
COURTS 14 (1931) ("A judge is not placed in that high situation merely as an instru-
ment of the parties. He has a duty of his own, independent of them, and that duty
is to investigate the truth.").
22. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540 (1965).
23. BOWERS, supra note 21, at 14. The absence of a law or statute is a com-
monly recognized when a judge is required to make discretionary decisions. See
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 467 (6th ed. 1990) (defining discretionary act as "[tihose
acts wherein there is no hard and fast rule as to course of conduct that one must or
must not take and, if there is [a] clearly defined rule, such would eliminate discre-
tion.") (citing Elder v. Anderson, 205 Cal. App. 2d 326 (5th Dist. 1962)).
24. BOWERS, supra note 21, at 14.
25. See, e.g., Kasper v. Helfrich, 421 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1967) (defin-
ing judicial discretion as "the option a trial judge has in doing or not doing a thing
that cannot be demanded by a litigant as an absolute right.").
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in State v. Grant,26 labeled judicial discretion "a sound judg-
ment that is not exercised arbitrarily, but with regard to what
is right and equitable under the circumstances and law, and
which is directed by the reasoning conscience of the trial judge
to a just result."27
The truth-seeking goal of the trial is "best served" when a
witness' testimony proceeds free from interruptions. 28 How-
ever, a prosecutor or defense attorney, in certain limited cir-
cumstances, may request that the judge allow an interruption
of a witness' testimony for "reasons that present themselves
during the progress of the case."29 The judge, as manager of the
trial proceedings, has "broad powers in determining the propri-
ety of permitting . . . temporary adjournments." 30 Prior to
granting a request for an interruption, the attorney must sug-
gest a reason. The judge is then charged with determining
whether the stated reason is satisfactory.31 The judge's author-
ity to make this decision "is the discretion upon which the
course to be chosen depends."32
As noted above, a court's truth-seeking purpose is best fur-
thered through uninterrupted witness testimony.3 3 The court,
however, may permit such an interruption at its discretion. An
interruption may be coupled with an attorney request to speak
with the witness. In People v. Narayan,3 the New York Court
of Appeals held that a trial judge's refusal to allow the defense
counsel to speak with his client while he was on the witness
stand, although arguably improper, did not constitute an abuse
of discretion. 35 In that case, the trial court interrupted the
cross-examination of the defendant to research the admissibil-
ity of a prosecution question.36 The judge ruled the question ad-
missible, but before the cross-examination continued, the
defense attorney requested an opportunity to speak with the
26. 519 P.2d 261, 265 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
27. Grant, 519 P.2d at 262.
28. Perry, 488 U.S. at 282.
29. BOWERS, supra note 21, at 309.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Perry, 488 U.S. at 282.
34. 58 N.Y.2d 904, 447 N.E.2d 51, 460 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1983).
35. Id. at 906, 447 N.E.2d at 52, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
36. Narayan, 58 N.Y.2d at 905, 447 N.E.2d at 52, 460 N.Y.S.2d at 504.
1996]
5
PACE LAW REVIEW
witness.37 The trial judge denied the attorney's request.38 In
affirming the ruling, the New York Court of Appeals found
"[tihe proper resolution [as to the determination of the propriety
of allowing the conference] lies within the sound discretion of
the trial court."39
Narayan aside, a judge may allow a conference between an
attorney and a witness, where a compelling reason exists. One
such reason involves a testifying defendant.40 The United
States Supreme Court has continually held that in such a situa-
tion, a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel4l would
be violated if the defendant was prohibited from conferring with
his or her attorney.42
For example, in Geders v. United States,43 the Supreme
Court held that a sequestration order, 44 prohibiting the defend-
ant from consulting with counsel during his criminal trial, vio-
lated his right to assistance of counsel.45 In Geders, the
defendant testified in his own defense about his alleged involve-
ment in a conspiracy to fly 1000 pounds of marijuana into the
United States. 46 Throughout the trial, whenever a recess inter-
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See U.S. CONST. amend. V. This amendment states that a person shall not
"be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Id. Where
there is a possibility that this may occur, courts may allow such conferences. This
restriction only applies in a criminal trial where the defendant has chosen to tes-
tify in his own defense.
41. The amendment states:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the assistance of
counsel in his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added).
42. See generally Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80, 89 (1976); Perry v.
Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 284 (1989).
43. 425 U.S. 80 (1976).
44. A sequestration order "is intended to assure that a witness will testify
concerning his own knowledge of the case without being influenced by testimony of
prior witnesses and to strengthen role of cross-examination in developing facts."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1366 (6th ed. 1979).
45. Geders, 425 U.S. at 80.
46. Geders, 425 U.S. at 81-82.
292 [Vol. 16:287
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rupted a witness' testimony, the judge ordered the witness "not
to discuss the case overnight with anyone."47
At one point during the trial, the defendant took the stand
and defense counsel concluded his direct examination at 4:55
p.m. 48 Thereafter, the judge announced an overnight recess. 49
The prosecutor asked the judge to give the defendant the same
instruction that all other witnesses had received. 50 Over the ob-
jection of the defense, the judge issued the sequestration or-
der.51 Subsequently, the defendant was convicted and the
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 52
47. Geders, 425 U.S. at 82.
48. Id. at 82.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. The exchange between Mr. Rinehart, the defense attorney, and the
court, regarding the propriety of the prosecution's request not to allow anyone,
including counsel, to speak with the witness follows:
"THE COURT: My question is: While a witness is subject to cross-examina-
tion, even though he is a defendant, does his attorney have the right to
confer with him before he is cross-examined?
"MR. RINEHART [defense counsel]: I feel that I do have the right to confer
with him but not to coach him as to what he may say on cross-examina-
tion or how to answer questions.
"THE COURT: Then what else would you need to talk to him about?
"MR. RINEHART: I don't know. Such as whom should I call as the next
witness.
"THE COURT: All right.
"MR. RINEHART: There are numerous strategic things that an attorney
must confer with his client about.
"THE COURT: Well I don't have any questions, Mr. Rinehart, about what
you - I think you are a disciplined man. I think you are trained in the
law. And I think if you should tell me, for instance, that you would not
discuss this direct testimony with your client I would accept that state-
ment without any qualification.
"MR. RINEHART: Your Honor, I can assure you of that.
"THE COURT: I understand that. But your client, as far as I know, has not
had any legal training; and I don't know anything about him other than
what I have heard here today. And I don't know that he is subject to
that same instruction - that he would understand it. "I think he would
understand it if I told him just not to talk to you; and I just think it is
better that he not talk to you about anything ....
"And I have held that I find that I don't think you would do anything wrong;
but I think it would be better, under the circumstances of this case.
And that is my ruling.
Geders, 425 U.S. at 84-85 n.1.
52. United States v. Fink, 502 F.2d 1 (5th Cir. 1974). On the point at issue,
the appellate court upheld the conviction because the defendant did not claim that
any prejudice resulted from being denied the opportunity to meet with counsel
7
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Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority, recognized
the judge's discretionary power to sequester witnesses. 53 How-
ever, he ruled that where the defendant is the witness, consul-
tation during an overnight recess may be necessary to devise
additional strategy, elicit additional information from the day's
testimony, and pursue other areas of information not previously
explored.54 For this reason, the Court reversed the trial court
ruling, stating "an order preventing petitioner from consulting
his counsel 'about anything' during a 17 hour overnight recess
between his direct and cross-examination impinged upon his
right to the assistance of counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment."55
After Geders, federal and state courts were divided as to
the applicability of the Supreme Court ruling to shorter re-
cesses.56 The Supreme Court revisited the Geders question in
Perry v. Leeke. 57 There, the Court held that the Geders rule,
permitting a conference between an attorney and non-defend-
ant witness during the trial, was not applicable to a fifteen min-
ute recess occurring between direct examination and cross-
examination.58 In Perry, the defendant was charged with par-
ticipating in a murder, kidnapping, and assault.59 The defend-
ant testified in his own defense.60 At the conclusion of his direct
during the recess. Geders, 425 U.S. at 86. However, the Supreme Court granted
certiorari to answer the question of whether "the order forbidding consultation
with [the defendant's attorney] overnight denied him the assistance of counsel in
violation of the Sixth Amendment." Id.
53. Geders, 425 U.S. at 87. "The judge's power to control the progress and,
within limits of the adversary system, the shape of the trial includes broad power
to sequester witnesses before, during, and after their testimony." Id.
54. Id. at 88.
55. Geders, 425 U.S. at 91.
56. See, e.g., Bova v. Dugger, 858 F.2d 1539 (11th Cir. 1988) (stating that an
attorney-defendant consultation during a fifteen minute recess in cross-examina-
tion was proper); Bova v. State, 410 So. 2d 1343 (Fla. 1982) (not allowing consulta-
tion during fifteen minute break in cross-examination of defendant violated 6th
amendment rights, however, error was harmless); People v. Stroner, 432 N.E.2d
348 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982) (stating right to counsel was not violated when discussion
of testimony was barred but other consultation was allowed during thirty minute
recess); Wooten-Bey v. State, 547 A.2d 1086 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988) (stating that
consultation with attorney during lunch recess was proper).
57. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
58. Id. at 284.
59. Id. at 274.
60. Id.
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examination, the judge called a fifteen minute recess and or-
dered the defendant not to speak with anyone, including his at-
torney.61 When the trial resumed, the defense moved for a
mistrial, which the judge denied.62
The Supreme Court distinguished Geders, reasoning that
the defendant was ordered not to speak with his attorney dur-
ing an overnight recess, a time a defendant would normally con-
fer with counsel.63 In Perry, however, the Court emphasized
that a witness is not normally allowed to confer with counsel
during testimony.6 4 The Court was careful to emphasize that
its ruling did not preclude consultation in all instances.65 In-
stead, the Court found that a judge's decision to allow a consul-
tation was discretionary and was to be based upon the facts of
the case before the court, rather than upon a constitutional
right available to all defendants who choose to take the stand.66
Courts have established a standard for what may be said to
be a reasonable basis for the judge to permit a mid-testimony
conference. 67 In People v. Enrique,6 8 the judge called a lunch
recess during the prosecution's cross-examination of the defend-
ant.6 9 After the jury left the courtroom, defense counsel asked if
he could speak with the witness.70 Regarding this request, the
judge responded that it was within his discretion to prohibit
such a conference. 71 However, the judge stated that he "might
entertain" the request if counsel wished to "tell [the court] what
[he] would like to say or how long [he] would like to say it."72
61. Id.
62. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 274 (1989).
63. Id. at 284.
64. Id. at 281. "The distinction rests ... on the fact that when a defendant
becomes a witness, he has no constitutional right to consult with his lawyer while
he is testifying." Id. at 281.
65. Id. at 284.
66. Id. "[Tihe Federal Constitution does not compel every trial judge to allow
the defendant to consult with his lawyer while his testimony is in progress if the
judge decides that there is a good reason to interrupt the trial for a few minutes."
Id. at 284-85.
67. See infra notes 68-78 and accompanying text.
68. 165 A.D.2d 13, 566 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1991).
69. Enrique, 165 A.D.2d at 14, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
70. Id. at 15, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 15-16, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
1996] 295
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After counsel replied that he would "rather not reveal that in-
formation,"73 the request was denied. 74
The Appellate Division, First Department, found it "signifi-
cant" that the trial court denied the request for the conference
only after inquiring about its substance.7 5 The Appellate Divi-
sion emphasized that prior to denying the request, the trial
court judge stated that any conference concerning the day's tes-
timony would be "inappropriate."7 6 Thus, in affirming the trial
court's ruling, the First Department reasoned that if the de-
fense counsel would have "identified a topic other than defend-
ant's testimony, the ban would have been, to that extent,
modified."7 7 The appellate court would have found such a com-
promise permissible under Perry.78
B. Alternatives to a Private Meeting Between Attorney
and Witness
1. Meeting where judge is present
One alternative to a private meeting is to include the judge
in the conference to assure that no improprieties occur. One
such impropriety is witness coaching. In United States v. Ad-
ams,79 a witness refused to testify because he feared for his
life.80 The trial judge held the witness in contempt, and ordered
the witness jailed.8 ' Four days later, in a meeting with the
judge, the prosecutor, and counsel for the defendant, the wit-
ness again refused to testify.8 2 He stated that "he would rather
stay in jail than testify and be killed."83 The trial judge asked
the defense counsel to leave, and held a meeting with the wit-
ness, the prosecutor, and the court reporter to discuss the possi-
73. Id. at 16, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
74. People v. Enrique, 165 A.D.2d 13, 16, 566 N.Y.S.2d 201, 202 (1st Dep't
1991).
75. Id. at 19, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 205.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id. See Perry, 488 U.S. at 284 n.8 (suggesting that it may have been per-
missible for the lower court judge to allow a consultation during a recess if the
substance did not involve the ongoing testimony).
79. 785 F.2d 917 (11th Cir. 1986).
80. Id. at 919.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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bility of enrolling the witness in the Witness Protection
Program.8 4 As a result of this meeting, the witness testified.85
Subsequently, based upon the witness' testimony, the defend-
ant was convicted.86
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that "in... the court's
residual power to ensure a just trial, and to protect . . . wit-
nesses, a judge may in very rare circumstances feel it essential
to confer with a ... witness on the record but outside the pres-
ence of others."87 As with allowing a private meeting, a judge's
option to include himself is a discretionary decision.88 Many
judges, however, hesitate to exercise this option.8 9
2. Impeachment of witness by the party who called him
New York Criminal Procedure Law (CPL) § 60.35(1) allows
a party, whose witness has given testimony which "disproves"
the party's position, to introduce evidence of a prior written or
oral statement made under oath.90 The Commission Staff Notes
comment on the reasoning for this law: "A party on the verge of
destruction at the hands of his own witness should at least be
84. United States v. Adams, 785 F.2d 917, 919 (11th Cir. 1986).
85. Id.
86. Id. at 918.
87. Id. at 920.
88. See South Omaha v. Fennell, 94 N.W. 632 (Neb. 1903). "The trial judge is
in a better position than the reviewing court to know when the circumstances war-
rant or require interrogation of witnesses from the bench." Id.
89. See State v. Prater, 468 N.E.2d 356 (Ohio 1983). A potential problem with
utilizing this alternative in a criminal trial is the denial of the defendant's right to
confront the witness testifying against him. This is a right guaranteed by the
sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. If
the judge does participate in meeting with the prosecutor and the witness, he can
provide a safeguard against this type of deprivation by assuring the defense coun-
sel the right to cross-examine the witness without being unduly limited in subject
matter or scope.
90. N.Y. CraM. PRoc. LAw § 60.35(1) (McKinney 1993). This section states, in
relevant part:
When, upon examination by the party who called him, a witness in a crimi-
nal proceeding gives testimony upon a material issue of the case which
tends to disprove the position of such party, such party may introduce evi-
dence that such witness has previously made either a written statement
signed by him or an oral statement under oath contradictory to such
testimony.
1996] 297
11
PACE LAW REVIEW
allowed to show why he called him and to attempt to restore the
status quo."9'
The right to impeach one's own witness, however, is not ab-
solute. In People v. Saez,9 2 the New York Court of Appeals lim-
ited an attorney's right to impeach his own witness to instances
where his client's case was damaged. 93 In Saez, a prosecution
witness in an armed robbery case testified on direct examina-
tion that she did not see whether the defendant was actually
carrying a gun.9 4 This testimony directly conflicted with her
prior grand jury testimony, where she had testified that the de-
fendant was carrying a gun.95 The Supreme Court, Bronx
County, however, refused to allow the prosecutor to impeach
the witness at trial with her grand jury testimony.96 The Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court and the New York Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial judge's ruling. The Court of Appeals
reasoned that the charged offense of armed robbery does not re-
quire that anyone actually see a weapon, therefore, the wit-
nesses' testimony did not affirmatively damage the case.9 7
The use of § 60.35(1) is further limited to clear contradic-
tions in testimony, not merely memory lapses. 98 In People v.
Fitzpatrick,ss the defendant, a union official, was charged with
perjury stenming from his alleged cashing of another's
paycheck. 100 A witness testified before the Grand Jury that he
cashed the check and gave the proceeds to the defendant.' 0' At
91. N.Y. CRIM. PRoc. LAw § 60.35 (Consol. 1994).
92. 69 N.Y.2d 802, 505 N.E.2d 945, 513 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1987).
93. Id. at 804, 505 N.E.2d at 946, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
94. Id. at 803, 505 N.E.2d at 946, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
95. People v. Saez, 69 N.Y.2d 802, 803, 505 N.E.2d 945, 946, 513 N.Y.S.2d
380, 381 (1987).
96. Id. at 804, 505 N.E.2d at 946, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 381.
97. Id. at 804, 505 N.E.2d at 946, 513 N.Y.S.2d at 381. See also N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAw § 60.35(3) (McKinney 1993)
When a witness has made a prior signed or sworn statement contradictory
to his testimony in a criminal proceeding upon a material issue of the case,
but his testimony does not tend to disprove the position of the party who
called him and elicited such testimony, evidence that the witness made such
prior statement is not admissible ....
Id.
98. See infra notes 99-105 and accompanying text.
99. 40 N.Y.2d 44, 351 N.E.2d 675, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28 (1976).
100. Id. at 46, 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
101. Id. at 47, 351 N.E.2d at 676, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
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trial, however, the witness testified that he did not remember
the events. As a result, the court granted the prosecutor per-
mission to treat the witness as a hostile witness under CPL
§ 60.35102 and the jury found the defendant guilty.10 3
After the Appellate Division affirmed, the New York Court
of Appeals reversed the lower court, holding that when a wit-
ness fails to "recall the events in question [it] does not tend to
disprove the prosecution's case, but is neutral and merely fails
to corroborate or bolster the case without contradicting any fac-
tual evidence."10 4 The Court of Appeals noted that not allowing
the impeachment may psychologically damage the party's case,
but classified this as a "risk" assumed when calling a witness. 05
3. Refreshing the memory of a witness
When a witness gives adverse testimony, questions calcu-
lated to refresh a witness' memory are another alternative to a
private meeting between an attorney and a testifying witness.
Questions posed in this manner may be used to bring out the
reason behind the change in testimony. In Bullard v. Pear-
sall,106 the court stated that "[q]uestions asked under the mask
of refreshing the recollection of the witness may be asked of the
witness for ... recalling to his mind the statements he previ-
ously made, and drawing out an explanation of his apparent
inconsistency." 10 7
C. Fearful Witnesses
The truthful testimony of a witness at trial is of paramount
importance. 08 This is especially true when the witness is called
upon to identify an assailant. Witness identification is "fre-
quently an essential piece of evidence. . . [because] more scien-
tific forms of identification evidence, such as fingerprint and
handwriting analyses, are not always available." 10 9 Therefore,
102. Id. at 48-49, 351 N.E.2d at 676-77, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 29.
103. Id. at 48, 351 N.E.2d at 677, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 30.
104. People v. Fitzpatrick, 40 N.Y.2d 44, 45, 351 N.E.2d 675, 386 N.Y.S.2d 28
(1976).
105. Id. at 52, 351 N.E.2d at 680, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 33.
106. 53 N.Y. 230 (1873).
107. Id. at 231.
108. See supra note 18.
109. LAFAVE, supra note 19, at 352.
1996] 299
13
PACE LAW REVIEW
extreme fear in a witness, where "[t]he quality of testimony...
[may] be impaired,"110 is another compelling reason to allow a
midtestimony conference.
In certain circumstances, the constitutional rights of a de-
fendant may be, to some degree, limited to insure that the fear-
ful witness testifies truthfully."' This may be true particularly
when the defendant is responsible for creating the witness' fear.
The Court of Appeals in People v. Hagan"2 held that the right
to a public trial, secured by the Sixth Amendment of the United
States Constitution, was not violated when the judge, due to the
fear of a witness, closed the courtroom to the public and
press. 113 There, the witness "represented to the court that [he]
believed that his life was in danger if he testified publicly."" 4
For this reason, he refused to testify while the individuals,
whom the witness thought were the source of the threats, were
present in the courtroom. 1 5 The judge had noticed that when
the witness was sworn in, certain individuals present in the
court "grinned" and the defendant "turned white as a sheet."116
As a result, the judge "closed the courtroom during this testi-
mony."' 1 7 The New York Court of Appeals held that "if, for a
good reason related directly to the management of the trial, the
Judge closes the courtroom as to the testimony of a witness...
a defendant is not necessarily deprived of a 'public' trial.""8
110. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 547 (1965).
111. See infra notes 112-118 and accompanying text.
112. 24 N.Y.2d 395, 248 N.E.2d 588, 300 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1969).
113. Id. at 399, 248 N.E.2d at 590, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 399, 248 N.E.2d at 591, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 838.
116. Id. at 398, 248 N.E.2d 590, 300 N.Y.S.2d 836 (quoting United States v.
Harold, 408 F.2d 125, 127 (2d Cir. 1969)).
117. 24 N.Y.2d at 398, 248 N.E.2d at 591, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 836.
118. Id. at 397-98, 248 N.E.2d at 590, 300 N.Y.S.2d at 837. See also People v.
Guzman, 176 A.D.2d 561, 563, 575 N.Y.S.2d 26, 29 (1st Dep't 1991) (holding that
"there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in ordering closure of the court-
room ... on the ground that the People had presented a sufficiently overriding
interest to the defendant's right to a public trial, i.e., the interest of the witness 'to
testify without interference, without fear.' ").
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D. Appropriate Role of Appellate Courts
Generally, appellate courts are reluctant to overturn dis-
cretionary rulings of lower courts absent legal error.119 One rea-
son for this reluctance is judicial economy. 120 An additional
reason for this reluctance is that the trial judge enjoys a unique
opportunity to view the evidence and the witnesses first
hand;121 an advantage the appellate court does not have.
Not all courts view the role of the appellate court in the
same way. For example, the Missouri Supreme Court, in Feurt
v. Caster,122 held that appellate courts are "duty bound to ap-
prove or reject all rulings of lower courts, even when made in
the exercise of a judicial discretion." 123 Other courts, however,
reject that notion.124 Judge Camden, referred to by one com-
mentator as one of the "greatest and purest"125 of all judges,
said that judicial discretion represents "the law of tyrants."126
He discouraged the use of discretionary decisions and pointed
out their many negative aspects.127 Judge Camden expounded,
"in the best [of circumstances a discretionary decision] is often-
119. 1 CHAMBERLAYN, THE MODERN LAW OF EVIDENCE § 177 (1911). "In mat-
ters properly of administration or discretion reversal should properly occur only
where error in law has been committed. Such an error may be, and most fre-
quently is, caused by a failure of the trial judge to exercise reason as the law re-
quires." Id.
120. Id. "It may be fairly observed that the action of many appellate courts in
this respect is such as not only to add enormously to their own labors, but also to
create a serious congestion of judicial business through repeated new trials and a
consequent practical denial of justice." Id.
121. See generally Day v. Day, 112 A.D.2d 972, 492 N.Y.2d 783 (2d Dep't
1985).
122. 73 S.W. 576 (Mo. 1903).
123. Feurt, 73 S.W. at 578. In so holding, however, the court recognized the
importance of discretionary rulings and the trial court judge's role in making these
decisions. "And whilst this court is always loath to interfere with discretionary
rulings of trial courts, nevertheless, such rulings are not conclusive upon this
court, and where they are interfered with it is ... because the ultimate responsibil-
ity for every judgement rests upon the court of final resort to which the case is
taken.... ." Id.
124. See, e.g., In Re Droege, 197 N.Y. 44, 45, 90 N.E. 340, 343 (1909).
125. BowERs, supra note 21, at 30.
126. Id.
127. Id. Camden continued: Judicial discretion is "always unknown; it is dif-
ferent in different men; it is causal, and depends upon constitution, temper, and
passion." Id.
1996]
15
PACE LAW REVIEW
times caprice; in the worst, it is every vice, folly and passion to
which human nature can be liable."128
In New York, however, appellate courts may not overturn
discretionary decisions of a trial court unless legal error is pres-
ent.129 In In re Droege,130 the New York Court of Appeals held
that it could not review the lawful exercise of a discretionary
decision by a lower court. 131 The court found that assuming ju-
risdiction over this type of decision would necessarily involve
"substituting [its] judgment and discretion" for that of the lower
court.
1 3 2
Other courts have considered prejudicial effect when deter-
mining whether appellate review of discretionary decisions is
proper. Professor Chamberlayn, in his treatise on evidence, 133
emphasized that an appellate court should only review, and
therefore, may only reverse a trial court on a discretionary mat-
ter if legal error is present. '3 Moreover, Chamberlayn believes
that the appellate court's power of review should be further re-
stricted to instances where, in addition to this legal error, "the
complaining party has, without his own fault, been substan-
tially prejudiced." 3 5 Although all courts do not accept
Chamberlayn's proposition, some have incorporated prejudicial
effect into decisions of whether to review a trial court ruling. 36
128. Id.
129. See infra notes 130-132 and accompanying text.
130. 197 N.Y. 44, 90 N.E. 340 (1909).
131. Droege, 197 N.Y. at 45, 90 N.E. at 343. Droege, the city Magistrate of
New York, was charged with misconduct for illegally discharging a prisoner from
imprisonment. Id. at 45, 90 N.E. at 341. The Association of the Bar of the City of
New York petitioned the Appellate Division to remove Droege "for cause." Id. The
Appellate Division found that Droege had been involved in misconduct and ordered
him removed "for cause." Id. at 48, 90 N.E. at 342. Since neither the Constitution
nor any statutes define "cause" in the context of "removal for cause," this was a
discretionary decision. Id. at 51, 90 N.E. at 43. If the Court of Appeals attempted
to judge the sufficiency of the "cause," it would be improperly assuming the power
of a lower court. Id.
132. Droege, 197 N.Y. at 50, 90 N.E. at 343. See also Cox v. Lykes Brothers,
237 N.Y. 376, 143 N.E. 226 (1924) (holding that "an appellate court may not over-
rule a ... [lower court's decision] unless the record shows no basis for the exercise
of discretion.").
133. See CHAMBERLAYN, supra note 119.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. See, e.g., United States v. Loyd, 743 F.2d 1555 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding
whether to... allow prosecutor to interview a witness during a trial recess so that
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E. Approaches of other jurisdictions
Prior to Branch, no New York case specifically addressed
whether a midtestimony private conference between an attor-
ney and witness was permissible. Similarly, there is no applica-
ble New York statute or rule to guide a judge's decision. Other
states and various federal circuit courts of appeal, however,
have addressed the question.
Some appellate courts have upheld these conferences, bas-
ing their propriety upon the discretionary decision of the judge.
In State v. Delarosa-Flores,13 7 the Court of Appeals of Washing-
ton upheld a trial court decision allowing a conference during a
short recess. There, the defendant was charged with several
counts of rape 138 stemming from the victim's pretrial statement
that the defendant forced her to engage in oral sex. 39 When
asked at trial whether she had any intercourse other than vagi-
nal and anal, the victim replied: "No."140 This testimony con-
fficted with her prior statement. 141 Immediately following this
testimony, the state requested a short recess to speak with the
victim. 42 The request was granted and upon the victim's re-
turn to the stand, "the defense objected to any further testi-
mony regarding other sexual acts."143 The court overruled the
objection, and the victim testified that the defendant forced her
to perform oral sex. 44
The Washington Court of Appeals found no abuse of discre-
tion.145 The court based this ruling on three findings: First, no
evidence suggested or proved that the prosecutor "did anything
prosecutors questions to the witness can be more precise is within the discretion of
the trial court and will not be reviewed absent abuse of that discretion, and show-
ing of prejudice is necessary to find an abuse." Id. at 1564; United States v. Burke,
495 F.2d 1226, 1233 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that trial court did not abuse its dis-
cretion by allowing a prosecutor to meet with a witness during a recess in cross-
examination because defense made no showing of prejudice).
137. 799 P.2d 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 738.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. State v. Delarosa-Flores, 799 P.2d 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990).
145. Id.
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more than refresh the victim's recollection."1 46 Second, no evi-
dence showed that the prosecutor had urged the victim to create
testimony.147 Finally, the post-recess testimony was "consistent
with her initial report to the police." 148 The court, in relying
upon Geders, recognized that there was an "important ethical
distinction between a prosecutor discussing testimony and im-
properly seeking to influence it." 49
Additionally, the court noted that cross-examination was a
sufficient safeguard under these circumstances.1 50 Nothing im-
peded the defense from fully cross-examining the witness re-
garding the conference during the recess. 151 The court found
that cross-examination could have been used skillfully to "de-
velop a record [to be used] in closing argument... raising ques-
tions as to the defendant's credibility .... 152
In United States v. De Jongh, 53 the judge allowed the pros-
ecutor to confer with a witness between that witnesses' direct
and cross-examination.15 4 During the morning session, when
the defense learned of the conversation, it "engendered no par-
ticular controversy." 55 However, later that afternoon, the de-
fense called the meeting "prejudicial and improper." 56 The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit found no error in allowing
the conference, stating that "the District Court possesses con-
siderable discretion ... to curb possible trial abuses." 57
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. State v. Delarosa-Flores, 799 P.2d 736 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990) (citing
Geders, 425 U.S. 80, 90 n.3 (1976)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. 937 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1991).
154. Id. at 2. The fact that the prosecutor and the witness met came out on
cross-examination. Id. It was the prosecutor's idea to have the meeting, although
the witness testified that she did remember "some more things" over the weekend.
Id.
155. Id. at 2.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 3. One applicable area in which the court of appeals suggests that
the district court has considerable discretion is in its "broad power to sequester
witnesses before, during, and after their testimony." Id. (quoting Geders, 425 U.S.
at 80).
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The court of appeals further stated that it was "aware of no
rule or ethical principal suggesting... that a prosecutor should
refrain from conferring with a government witness before the
start of cross-examination." 58 The court compared a conference
immediately following direct examination to the routine prepa-
ration of the witness before he takes the stand and found that
neither presented a high "risk of taint" to the testimony. 159
The issue of whether a conference between an attorney and
witness "taints" the witness' testimony was also addressed in
Frierson v. State.160 There, a private meeting occurred during
the direct examination of the witness. 161 While testifying, the
victim became very emotional and the prosecution requested a
recess.162 The court granted the State's request. 163
The defendant, relying on Perry v. Leeke, 64 contended that
the trial court erred in denying his motion to preclude the con-
ference. 65 The court found this argument unpersuasive and
distinguished the situation in Frierson from that in Perry.
66
First, unlike in Perry, the court in Frierson was not worried
about the attorney coaching the witness. Rather, the confer-
ence was allowed because the witness became emotional and
needed to "regain her poise." 67 It was clear that this conference
was not held for strategic purposes. Second, the conferences oc-
curred at different times during the respective trials. In Perry,
the conference occurred between the defendant's direct exami-
nation and cross-examination, whereas in Frierson, the confer-
ence was during direct examination. The court found that a
conference occurring during direct examination was "much less
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. 543 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
161. Id. at 670.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. 488 U.S. 272 (1989).
165. 543 N.E.2d at 671. The term "abuse of discretion" is often misunder-
stood. It is often thought of as connoting a bad or improper motive. This is not
correct. It is defined as an "erroneous conclusion and judgment, one that is clearly
against the logic and effect of the facts and circumstances before the court, or the
reasonable, probable, and actual deductions to be drawn from such facts and cir-
cumstances." BowERs, supra note 21, § 12 at 20, (citing Richardson v. Augustine,
49 P. 930 (1897); Starr v. State, 115 P. 356 (Okla. Crim. 1911)).
166. 543 N.E.2d at 672.
167. Id.
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likely undertaken for strategy purposes."168 Finally, in Frier-
son, the defendant was not the witness with whom the confer-
ence occurred and therefore, no Sixth Amendment issue was
presented, as in Perry.16 9
Still, other courts have been highly critical of midtestimony
conferences. Although some appellate courts have upheld the
trial court's decision to permit these conferences, they have
done so only because the resulting error was not prejudicial. In
United States v. Malik,170 the prosecutor had several private
conferences with a witness during direct examination. 171 One
conference resulted in a correction to the witness' prior testi-
mony regarding a minor detail. 7 2 The defense moved to strike
the corrected testimony and further to restrict government
counsel from conferring with the witness before his direct exam-
ination was completed. 73 In denying the motion, the court rea-
soned that although a court rule precluded conversations
between a government witness and government counsel during
cross-examination, such conversations were permitted during
direct examination. 174
The appellate court, nonetheless, reprimanded the prosecu-
tor because the meeting was "unnecessary.'1 75 In doing so, the
court suggested that there were many well-known ways, on the
record, in which the prosecutor could have corrected the wit-
nesses' direct examination testimony. 176 Ultimately, the appel-
late court found that it was within the trial judge's discretion to
determine the propriety of such a conference. 77 Because only
one correction was made to a minor detail, the court found no
prejudicial error and affirmed the trial court ruling denying a
mistrial.178
168. Id. at 673.
169. Id. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
170. 800 F.2d 143 (7th Cir. 1986).
171. Id. at 148.
172. Id.
173. Id. at 148
174. Id.
175. Id. at 149.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
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Similarly, in Duke v. United States,179 private counsel and a
testifying witness conferred during direct examination. As a re-
sult of this conference, the witness corrected a former statement
made to prosecutors and testified that in exchange for his testi-
mony, charges against him in another case were dropped.180
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated that while it
"disapproved of the practice of any witness... receiving secret
advice from anyone while he is on the stand,"""' in this particu-
lar case, it did not prejudice the defendant. 82
III. People v. Branch
A. The Facts
The defendant, Lamont Branch, was charged with murder
in the second degree, burglary in the first degree, and criminal
possession of a weapon in the second degree. 83 These charges
resulted from the shooting of Lushon Josephs, which occurred
inside Josephs' Brooklyn apartment.l84
Thomas Edwards was a key witness for the prosecution. 8 5
He stated to police and testified before the Grand Jury that the
defendant carried a gun when he entered the victim's apart-
ment. 86 Edwards also stated that he heard a shot from within
the apartment and viewed the defendant exit, along with two
179. 255 F.2d 721 (9th Cir. 1958).
180. Id. at 728. Ironically, in this particular instance, the admissions made
by the witness after the conference actually helped the defendant. Id. Since the
witness was testifying in exchange for the dropping of a pending charge, this
showed a bias and actually supported the defendant's theory of the case. Id. The
judge stated that "t]his admission supported the theory of Duke and redounded to
his benefit. He thus elicited, upon cross-examination, an interest or motive which
might indicate bias after the witness had flatly denied such a fact on direct." Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. The defendant's correction in testimony actually helped the defend-
ant because it brought out a motive and bias behind the witnesses testimony.
183. People v. Branch, 191 A.D.2d 576, 595 N.Y.S.2d 88, 89 (2d Dep't 1993).
184. 83 N.Y.2d at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967,612 N.Y.S.2d at 366. The defendant
and two other individuals entered Josephs' building and went to the second floor
where Josephs' apartment was located. Josephs did not open the door and one of
the defendant's companions forced the door open. All three entered the apartment.
Brief for Respondent at 5-6, People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612
N.Y.S.2d 365 (1994) (No. 89-11099).
185. Id. at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (1994).
186. Id.
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others.187 Edwards claimed that Branch was still armed when
he left. l 88
The defendant was tried in the Supreme Court, Kings
County. 8 9 At trial, the judge instructed the court officers to
bring Edwards into the courtroom through a private entrance
on the day he was to testify. 190 Notwithstanding these instruc-
tions, Edwards was brought in through a public entrance. 191 At
trial, the prosecutor, during direct examination, asked Edwards
who was carrying the gun. 192 Edwards replied that one of the
defendants' companions was holding the weapon and that the
defendant was unarmed. 193 Because this contradicted his ear-
lier statements, the prosecutor immediately asked for a bench
conference and expressed concern that the witness's trial testi-
mony differed from his pre-trial statements. 94 The prosecutor
stated that the witness had been intimidated by the defendant's
family.195 Since the court officer mistakingly brought the wit-
ness in through the public area, the prosecutor requested that
she be allowed to speak with the witness. 96
Overruling a defense objection, the judge allowed the con-
ference and then granted a short recess for the consultation. 197
The judge instructed both attorneys that the witness could be
cross-examined without limitation. 198 He also told the witness
that he was not required to speak to the prosecutor. 199 In addi-
tion, the judge informed the jury that the recess was for the
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Branch, 191 A.D.2d at 576, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
190. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366. The
court had ordered that Edwards be sequestered so he could not come in contact
with defendant's family or friends. Edwards was not brought to the back of the
courtroom where he was supposed to wait to testify. As a result of this, people
were able to approach him while he awaited his time to testify. Brief for Respon-
dent at 8-9, People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365
(1994) (No. 89-11099).
191. 83 N.Y.2d at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
192. Id.
193. Id..
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365
(1994).
197. Id. at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
198. Id.
199. Id.
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prosecutor and the witness to meet, but the jury was not told of
the reason for the meeting.200
After the conference, the witness returned to the stand and
testified that the defendant carried the gun.201 Although pro-
vided with the opportunity, the defense did not cross-examine
the witness regarding the conference. However, in summation,
the defense suggested that the witness changed his testimony
as a result of improper coaching.20 2 Ultimately, the defendant
was convicted of murder in the second degree, burglary in the
first degree, and criminal possession of a weapon in the second
degree. 203
B. Procedural History
The defendant appealed to the Supreme Court, Appellate
Division,20 4 contending that the trial court erred by allowing the
conference between the prosecutor and the witness. 205 The Ap-
pellate Division affirmed, holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. 20 6 The court reasoned that a meeting be-
tween the prosecutor and the witness did not constitute "an im-
proper impeachment of the witness."20 7 Finally, the appellate
division held that the defendant was not deprived of his right to
200. Id.
201. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 666, 634 N.E.2d 966, 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d
365, 366 (1994). The prosecutor was prohibited from bringing out the reasons be-
hind the change in testimony. Edwards was restricted to saying that he was
scared and could not give a reason for this fear. Id.
202. Id. The relevant portion of the defense's summation is as follows:
[Ylou saw him when he got up on the stand and he said Bigum had the gun,
and then the District Attorney stopped dead in her tracks and didn't ask
him any more questions. Recess. Goes out and talks to him; comes back and
changes answer. "I was scared." Did that person look scared to you?
Brief for Respondent at 10, People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612
N.Y.S.2d 365 (1994) (No. 89-11099).
203. 83 N.Y.2d at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
204. Branch, 191 A.D.2d at 576, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 88-89. Two issues went
before the appellate division. The first involved the propriety of admitting evi-
dence of the witnesses prior dealings with the defendant regarding drug activities.
Id. The court held that it was not improper for these previous activities to be the
basis for an in court identification. The court also found that the court gave proper
limiting instructions. Id.
205. Branch, 191 A.D.2d at 576, 595 N.Y.S.2d at 89.
206. Id.
207. Id. By "improper," the court was referring to the method of impeachment
outlined in CPL § 60.35.
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confrontation, because the trial court allowed the defense to
cross-examine the witness about the substance of the confer-
ence.208 The Court of Appeals granted leave to appeal.20 9
C. Majority Opinion
For the majority, Judge Simons 210 acknowledged the gen-
eral proposition that witnesses should testify during both direct
examination and cross-examination without interruption, to
best assure that the truth-seeking function of the trial
prevails.21' However, the court rejected the notion that a trial
court must absolutely allow or absolutely prohibit midtestimony
conferences.21 2 In rejecting such a firm rule, the court of ap-
peals noted "that trial courts may allow such conferences as a
matter of discretion." 213 Referring to the Perry line of cases,21 4
the court then stated that the rules applicable to attorney con-
ferences with testifying defendant witnesses should "apply gen-
erally to other witnesses, including the prosecution witness
here."215
The court repeated its earlier statement that the decision
whether to allow a midtestimony conference is one of judicial
discretion. 21 6 The court then held that since the court of ap-
peals, "as a court of law, may reverse such decisions only for
legal error,"21 7 it lacks the power to substitute its judgment
208. Id.
209. 81 N.Y.2d 1011, 616 N.E.2d 856, 600 N.Y.S.2d 199 (1993).
210. Judge Simons wrote the majority opinion. Judges Bellacosa, Smith, and
Levine concurred.
211. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366 (citing
Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989); People v. Enrique, 80 N.Y.2d 869, 600
N.E.2d 229, 587 N.Y.S.2d 598 (1992); People v. Narayan, 58 N.Y.2d 904, 447
N.Y.2d 51, 460 N.Y.S.2d 503 (1983)).
212. Id.
213. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
214. This line of cases, beginning with Geders, 425 U.S. 80 (1976), and contin-
uing through Leeke, 488 U.S. 272 (1989), involved midtestimony conferences be-
tween a defense attorney and his client. See supra notes 43-66 and accompanying
text.
215. 83 N.Y.2d at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
216. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367. See
supra note 213 and accompanying text.
217. 83 N.Y.2d at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The court
described legal error as where "the case presented shows no room for exercise of...
reasonable discretion." Id. (quoting Matter of Coombs v. Edwards, 280 N.Y. 361,
364, 21 N.E.2d 353, 354 (1939)).
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when facts and inferences, although they may conflict, are rea-
sonable to support a result.218 The court found it "inconsequen-
tial" that other methods were available to address this
problem. 219 Although the situation might have been handled
differently by other judges, the court of appeals ruled that the
availability of alternative methods is not the proper standard of
review. 220
The court analyzed the trial judge's decision regarding the
conference, and found that the trial judge was faced with a di-
lemma. On the one hand, there was a witness who was lying
because he was intimidated by the defendant's family members;
on the other, there was a request for a private conference where
improper coaching could occur. Ultimately, the trial judge was
required to make a decision that would not undermine the
truth-seeking function of the trial. The court of appeals found
that the trial judge's decision represented a "sound middle
path" between unconditionally allowing the testimony and ab-
solutely prohibiting it.221 By allowing the conference to occur
with appropriate safeguards, the trial judge "allowed the People
a chance to rehabilitate their case to some extent, yet fully pro-
tected both the defendants right to cross-examination and the
jury's authority to make informed determinations as to facts
and credibility."222
Balancing the need to assure the truth-seeking function of
the trial, while concomitantly preserving the rights of the de-
fendant, the Court of Appeals held that the trial court acted
properly.223 The court acknowledged the following safeguards:
1) the court told the witness that he was not required to speak
to the prosecutor; 2) the jury was only told that the witness was
removed so the prosecutor could talk to him; 3) the prosecutor
was barred from introducing details about the change in testi-
218. Id. (citing Cox v. Lykes Bros., 237 N.Y. 376, 382, 143 N.E. 226, 228
(1924); In Re Droege, 197 N.Y. 44, 53, 90 N.E. 340, 343 (1909)).
219. 83 N.Y.2d at 668, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367. The court
acknowledged that the dissent was correct in suggesting that an in camera confer-
ence or a CPL § 60.35 impeachment would have also resolved the problem at hand.
Id.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
223. Id.
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mony; 4) Edward's contradictory statements remained on the
record to be considered by the jury; 5) the defense was permit-
ted to cross-examine the witness regarding the substance of the
conference; and 6) defense counsel was allowed to raise the pos-
sibility of witness coaching in summation. 224 After examining
the trial court's action in light of the then existing situation, the
court of appeals held that as a matter of law, the trial court did
not abuse its discretion. 225
Finally, the court of appeals reviewed the law of other juris-
dictions which have dealt with this situation. 226 The court
found that its holding followed these courts' rulings. The court
held that "to unduly limit a trial court's discretionary power in
matters concerning trial management increases the likelihood
that rigid rules will replace common sense and that the truth-
seeking function of a trial will be impaired not advanced." 227
D. Dissenting Opinion
Judge Titone, dissenting, 228 believed that the trial court's
ruling "fell well outside the permissible range of trial court dis-
cretion,"229 and presented a situation which would likely inter-
fere with the truth-seeking function of the trial.230 In this
instance, the dissent found no "sound reasons" to justify stray-
ing from "accepted courtroom practice."231
The dissent rejected the majority's proposition that midtes-
timony conferences were permissible based upon Perry and En-
rique.232 The dissenters reasoned that the cases should have
been factually distinguished, rather than used as a basis of sup-
port because each involved conferences between a testifying de-
224. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 667-68, 634 N.E.2d 966, 968, 612
N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (1984).
225. Id. at 669, 634 N.E.2d at 969, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
226. Id. at 668, 634 N.E.2d at 968-69, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367-68.
227. Id. at 669, 634 N.E.2d at 969, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 368.
228. Id. at 669, 634 N.E.2d at 969, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Titone, J., dissent-
ing). Chief Judge Kaye and Judge Ciparick concurred in the dissent.
229. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 669, 634 N.E.2d 966, 969, 612 N.Y.S.2d
635, 368 (1994).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 670-71, 634 N.E.2d at 969, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 368 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
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fendant and their counsel.233 The difference between a
testifying defendant and a prosecution witness was "signifi-
cant,"2 since those rulings rested upon a defendant's right to
assistance of counsel. 23 5 The defendant in the instant case
never asserted that the midtestimony conference violated his
right to counsel.
The dissent also found no New York precedent which ad-
dressed the issue of midtestimony conferences involving non-de-
fendant witnesses. 236 Since no case law controlled, the defense
found no "precedentially supported reason to treat the question
as one that falls within the broad, virtually unguided discretion
of the trial court . . . ."2 Instead, the dissent advocated that
the court fashion a firm rule, ensuring that the truth-seeking
functions of the trial remain unhindered.238
The dissenters further asserted that classifying the deci-
sion to allow midtestimony conferences as discretionary would
not "advance the truth-seeking process,"23 9 regardless of the full
opportunity for cross-examination. 240 The dissent emphasized
that allowing these conferences runs counter to the common
law's mistrust of private conferences.2 1 The dissent cited Peo-
ple v. Enrique to stress the importance of this proposition. 24 In
that case, the court did not allow a private consultation during
a lunch recess based upon this mistrust.
The dissent believed that trial courts should have some dis-
cretion to permit the "suspect practice" of midtestimony confer-
ences.243 It qualified this belief, however, by stating that this
233. Id. at 670, 634 N.E.2d at 969-70, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 368-69.
234. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 670, 634 N.E.2d 966, 970, 612 N.Y.S.2d
365, 369 (Titone, J., dissenting) (1994).
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 670, 634 N.E.2d 966, 970, 612 N.Y.S.2d
365, 369 (1994).
240. Id.
241. Id. (citing Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 281 (1989) "'[Mt is a common
practice for a judge to instruct a witness not to discuss his or her testimony with
third parties,' since mid-testimony consultations by witnesses can impede 'the
truth seeking function of the trial' in several ways including 'unethical "coach-
ing." '" Id.
242. Id. at 671, 643 N.E.2d at 970, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 369.
243. Id.
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discretion should be "narrowly circumscribed and... subject to
review under one or more specific criteria."2 " The dissent sug-
gested "necessity" as one such criteria.245
The dissent found "necessity" to be an appropriate thresh-
old standard because "less perilous methods for remedying ap-
parent reversals in a prosecution witness's story" exist.24 One
such method is CPL § 60.35, which allows the prosecutor to im-
peach the witness by asking leading questions regarding a prior
inconsistent statement.247 Although, as the dissent admitted,
this technique is difficult to implement because "case law has
established a relatively stringent standard as a predicate for in-
voking [it],"248 they also believed that this apparent difficulty
should not automatically justify a midtestimony conference. 249
The dissent further suggested the use of in camera confer-
ences, where the witness, opposing counsel, and stenographer
are present, as an alternative to a private midtestimony confer-
ence.250 The dissent found this alternative more appropriate be-
cause no privacy problem surfaces. 251 Since it is the privacy
that "creates the opportunity for coaching and tampering,"252
and no attorney-client relationship or privilege existed, an "un-
supervised and unmonitored" conference was not necessary. 253
The dissent rejected the majority's proposition that any
prejudice to the defendant could be remedied through cross-ex-
amination.254 The dissent pointed out two disadvantages of
cross-examination: first, that any question asked carries the
244. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 671, 634 N.E.2d 966, 970, 612 N.Y.S.2d
365, 369 (1994)(quoting People v. Pendleton, 394 N.E.2d 496, 507 (IlI. 1979))
"[Mid-testimony discussions between prosecutors and their witness 'pose a tanta-
lizing potential for misconduct' and thus 'they are to be strictly scrutinized.'" Id.
245. Id. at 671, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
246. Id.
247. See N.Y. CRiM. PRoc. LAw § 60.35 (McKinney 1993).
248. 82 N.Y.2d at 671-72, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
249. Id. at 672, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
250. Id. See also United States v. Adams, 785 F.2d 917 (11th Cir. 1986); King-
ery v. State, 523 So. 2d 1199 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988).
251. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 672, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370
(Titone, J., dissenting).
252. Id.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 673, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370.
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risk that the resulting answer may be harmful; and second, that
a well-coached witness will be able to give an undetected un-
truthful answer. 25 5 Additionally, the dissent believed that re-
quiring the defense to cross-examine the witness to dispel any
prejudice "places an unfair and unnecessary burden on the
defense."256
Finally, the dissent stated that discretionary rulings may
be challenged in a court of law, even where legal error is not
present. 257 The dissent found that trial courts have "tremen-
dous latitude"258 in managing and directing trials, although,
this discretion has limits. 259 The appropriate limit here, was
that the discretion be "exercised within a framework of legal
rules, criteria and general principals.. . "260 The court's power
of review is based upon this framework.
IV. Analysis
A. Majority Opinion and Its Rationale
People v. Branch is the first case in which New York courts
determined whether a midtestimony conference between a non-
defendant witness and a prosecutor was proper. Although a
case of first impression in New York, other jurisdictions have
ruled on this question.26 1 In jurisdictions which confronted the
issue, the results varied. 262 The United States Supreme Court
addressed a similar, but not identical question in Geders v.
United States,263 holding a conference between a defendant wit-
ness and counsel during an overnight recess permissible. 264
The Court then addressed a similar issue involving a shorter
recess after direct examination in Perry v. Leeke.265 There, the
255. Id. at 673, 634 N.E.2d at 972, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
256. Id. at 673, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
257. Id. at 674, 634 N.E.2d at 972, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. See supra part II.E.
262. Id.
263. 425 U.S. 80. See supra notes 43-55 and accompanying text.
264. Geders, 425 U.S. at 91.
265. 488 U.S. 272. See supra notes 57-66 and accompanying text.
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Court ruled that the trial judge improperly permitted the
conference. 266
New York courts confronted a related issue in People v. En-
rique,267 where the judge denied the defense counsel's request to
meet with his client during a lunch recess.268 Although courts
confronted with this issue split on the permissibility of these
conferences, virtually all have continually held the following: 1)
the judge must make a discretionary decision on a case-by-case
basis to determine the propriety of allowing the conference; and
2) the decision must further the truth-seeking objective of the
court.
2 6 9
In Branch, the New York Court of Appeals recognized the
important role that uninterrupted testimony plays in the truth-
seeking function of a trial.270 However, the court refused to set
forth a per se rule prohibiting these conferences. Instead, the
court found that a trial court may permit such conferences in its
"broad discretion."271
While the New York Court of Appeals correctly decided
Branch, it erroneously relied on the Perry line of cases to sup-
port its ruling. There are several differences which deem those
cases inapplicable. The first distinction, and perhaps the most
important, is that the holdings in the Perry line of cases were
based upon midtestimony conferences where the defendant was
the testifying witness. 272 In Branch, however, the witness was
a non-party prosecution witness. The crucial difference be-
tween a defendant-witness and a non-party witness is that the
defendant witness possesses a Sixth Amendment right to coun-
sel.2 73 The courts in the Perry line of cases based their rulings
upon this basic constitutional right. A non-party witness does
not possess a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and thus, the
analysis differs.
266. Perry, 488 U.S. at 284-85.
267. 165 A.D.2d 13, 566 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1st Dep't 1991). See supra notes 68-78
and accompanying text.
268. 165 A.D.2d at 16, 566 N.Y.S.2d at 202.
269. See supra notes 34-78, 137-182 and accompanying text.
270. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 666, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
271. Id. at 666-67, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
272. See supra notes 43-66 and accompanying text.
273. See supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Additionally, treating non-party witnesses and defendant
witnesses alike, assumes that the same evidentiary rules apply
to both. This assumption, however, is incorrect. Some differ-
ences in the treatment of these two types of witnesses include:
the circumstances in which self-incrimination rights may be in-
voked;274 circumstances in which character evidence may be
used;275 testimony upon preliminary matters;276 and impeach-
ment by evidence of conviction of a crime.277 These differences
support the maintenance of separate rules for testifying defend-
ants and non-party witnesses.
A second distinction between Perry and Branch is the phase
of the trial during which the conference took place. Unlike
Perry, the conference in Branch occurred during direct exami-
nation.278 Regarding this distinction, the Perry court stated:
[I]t is entirely appropriate for a trial judge to decide, after listen-
ing to the direct examination of any witness, whether defendant
or non-defendant, that cross-examination is more likely to elicit
truthful responses if it goes forward without allowing the witness
the opportunity to consult with ... his or her lawyer. 279
The court in Perry failed to differentiate between types of wit-
nesses, however, it confined its reasoning to conferences occur-
ring between direct examination and cross-examination.
Cross-examination is one of the most effective tools avail-
able for finding the truth °80 A conference occurring directly
274. E. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 130 (2d ed. 1972) [hereinafter
CLEARY]. The privilege confers a significantly different right upon one who is the
accused in a criminal proceeding as compared to one who is simply a witness in a
criminal or other proceeding. Basically, the right of an accused is the right not
only to avoid giving incriminating responses to inquiries put to him but also to be
free from the inquiries themselves. Id.
275. See generally CLEARY, supra note 274, §§ 186-195. See also FED. R. EVID.
404. Rule 404 outlines the permissible ways in which character evidence may be
used in a trial. Section (a) relates to "Character Evidence Generally." Within this
section, character evidence of the accused and character evidence of a witness are
separated, each with its own applicable rules. Id.
276. See FED. R. EVID. 104(d). 'The accused does not, by testifying upon a
preliminary matter, become subject to cross-examination as other witnesses do."
Id.
277. See FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(1).
278. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
279. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989).
280. See, e.g. Perry v. Leeke, 488 U.S. 272, 282 (1989); Geders v. United
States, 425 U.S. 80, 89 (1976); United States v. De Jongh, 937 F.2d 1, 3 (1st Cir.
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prior to or during a cross-examination has the greatest poten-
tial to impair the truth-seeking function of the trial. It is dur-
ing cross-examination that coaching will more likely occur.
Attorneys generally prepare their witnesses for direct ex-
amination; this often includes reviewing with the witness the
questions that will be asked, and formulating answers to these
questions. Because attorneys ask their own witness planned
questions with rehearsed answers during direct examination,
the attorney has already controlled the witnesses' testimony.
Midtestimony strategy meetings are not necessary during di-
rect examination. Cross-examination, however, "depends for its
effectiveness on the ability of counsel to punch holes in a wit-
ness's testimony at just the right time, in just the right way."281
Thus, it is during cross-examination that an attorney would
presumably need to meet with his witness for strategy
purposes.
Because Branch was a case of first impression, the court of
appeals should have considered cases which were more factu-
ally similar. One such case, Frierson v. State,28 2 involved a
prosecutor's request for a conference during the direct examina-
tion of a non-party witness.2 3 The Branch court faced the iden-
tical situation. In Frierson, the court found Perry "inapplicable"
because of factual differences. 284 The court emphasized that
Frierson involved a non-defendant witness and a conference
during direct examination, whereas Perry, alternatively, in-
volved a conference with a defendant witness between direct ex-
amination and cross-examination. 2 5 After distinguishing
Perry, the Frierson court held that the trial judge did not abuse
his discretion in allowing the conference when a witness testi-
fied falsely due to emotional distress.28 6 Because of the factual
similarities, the Branch court should have relied more strongly
upon Frierson, rather than Perry, for its ruling.
1991); Frierson v. State, 543 N.E.2d 669, 673 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989); People v. En-
rique, 165 A.D.2d 13, 17, 566 N.Y.S.2d 201, 204 (1st Dep't 1991); Holtzman v.
Tobin, 78 Misc. 2d 8, 358 N.Y.S.2d 94, 95 (1st Dep't 1974).
281. Perry, 488 U.S. at 282.
282. 543 N.E.2d 669 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989).
283. Id. at 670.
284. Id. at 673.
285. Id.
286. Id.
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B. Appropriate Standard of Review
1. Permissible Scope of Review Suggested by the Dissent
The dissent in Branch attacked the majority for applying
an improper standard of review. 287 The majority stated that
"[t]his court, as a court of law, may reverse [discretionary] deci-
sions only for legal error . -*"288 The dissent stated that judi-
cial discretion is limited and must be exercised in a legal
"framework of rules, criteria, and general principals."28 9 The
dissent found this "framework" reviewable. 290 Applying the dis-
sent's suggested framework, every occurrence at the trial would
be reviewable because each falls within a legal framework, by
virtue of its mere occurrence during the trial. Thus, according
to the dissent's theory, an appellate court should review all dis-
cretionary decisions and would possess the authority to address
questions not even appealed. In our judicial system, this is not
the assigned role of appellate courts. 291
The dissent further suggested that the court of appeals
should draw lines and establish criteria to guide all rulings
within this legal framework.292 However, applying this sugges-
tion, the court of appeals would be responsible for the impossi-
ble task of establishing parameters into which every judicial
decision must fall. This suggestion offends the trial judge's role
as manager of the trial and relinquishes his discretionary deci-
sionmaking power, both essential to the trial's truth seeking
function.293
2. The "Necessity" Standard
The dissent, alternatively, suggested a less extreme posi-
tion regarding the standard of review. Under the dissent's sug-
gested alternative, trial courts would be given some discretion
to allow midtestimony conferences, however, their discretion
287. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 674, 634 N.E.2d at 972, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371
(Titone, J., dissenting).
288. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
289. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 674, 634 N.E.2d at 972, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371
(Titone, J., dissenting).
290. Id.
291. See supra notes 119-136 and accompanying text.
292. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 674, 634 N.E.2d at 972, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 371.
293. See supra part IIA.
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would be subject to review based upon "necessity."294 The dis-
sent justified this standard with the proposition that "less peril-
ous" alternatives to a private conference exist.295  The
alternatives the dissent suggested were impeachment of the
witness through CPL § 60.35 or an in camera conference. 296
There are two inherent problems with the dissent's sug-
gested approaches. First, the alternatives to the private confer-
ence would prove ineffective in many situations. CPL § 60.35
allows an attorney to impeach his own witness if a prior incon-
sistent statement, made under oath, damages that party's
case.297 However, this alternative would not have elicited truth-
ful testimony from the witness in Branch. This witness feared
for his life. Questioning the witness while still in the presence
of the jury and the spectators, the prosecutor does not provide
any additional incentive for the witness to testify truthfully.
This witnesses' fear originated from threats made by people
within the courtroom. Although the prosecutor may ask differ-
ent questions, the witness is still required to answer out loud in
front of the jury and the public. Speaking within the public ear-
shot was the basis of the witnesses' fear, and CPL § 60.35 would
not sufficiently alleviate that fear.
The second suggested alternative, an in camera conference,
has its own problems. 298 A witness who is reluctant to testify
truthfully because of threats or a fear for his life, may be just as
reluctant to talk about the problem in a private conference
where the judge is present. Additionally, the witness may be
more reluctant to state the truth or the reasons for having testi-
fied untruthfully, knowing the entire conversation is being tran-
scribed for the record. Again, this alternative would likely not
have elicited truthful testimony in Branch.
Additionally, using "necessity" as the appropriate standard
of review would not assist in the court's truth-seeking function,
the overall objective of the trial.299 Instead, it would more likely
294. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 671, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370
(Titone, J., dissenting).
295. Id.
296. Id. at 671-2, 634 N.E.2d at 971, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 370 (Titone, J.,
dissenting).
297. See supra part II.B.
298. See supra part II.B.1.
299. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
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impede this function. If the applicable standard became "neces-
sity," judges would waste precious court time ensuring that an
attorney has attempted to utilize all possible alternatives to the
private conference, before allowing it. In some cases, midtes-
timony private conferences will be the only vehicle for ascer-
taining the truth. With a necessity standard, a judge is
essentially required to try all other unsuccessful options before
allowing the conference. Again, this is time consuming and ulti-
mately may still fail to ascertain the truth.
C. The Standard of Review Which Emerged
The dissent was correct, however, in suggesting that the
court should establish criteria to guide future judges who may
be faced with a similar situation.300 The "necessity" standard,
described above, as a threshold is too high. A more appropriate
standard would be to allow a private midtestimony conference
where a compelling reason exists and the general objectives of
the trial and the interests of justice will be best served. Without
enunciating this as a standard, as such, the Branch court ap-
plied the facts to this standard to determine whether the confer-
ence was appropriate.
The majority found that a compelling reason existed for the
trial judge to allow such a conference. The judge previously or-
dered court officials to bring the witness into court through a
private entrance. Notwithstanding this order, the witness was
"forced to enter through the public area."30 1 As a result, the wit-
ness came in contact with the defendant's family, who allegedly
threatened his life.30 2 This threat, and the resulting fear for his
life, caused the witness to testify falsely. The court highlighted
the compelling nature of this situation, stating: "Significantly, it
was alleged that the witness was lying, not because of anything
the prosecutor had done or failed to do, but because of a hallway
confrontation that would not have occurred had court security
personnel followed instructions."s°3 This situation presented
the compelling reason for allowing a private conference.
300. See supra note 238 and accompanying text.
301. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d at 665, 634 N.E.2d at 967, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 366.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
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Next, the Branch court assured that it preserved the gen-
eral objectives of the trial. The court stated that it was "[fiaced
with the need to make sure the court's truth-seeking function
was not impaired."3°4 The judge, realizing that the witnesses'
fear for his life impeded the search for truth, calculated his rul-
ing to overcome this impediment. Although the trial court had
"at its disposal other means of dealing with this problem,"30 5 the
path it chose was calculated to achieve its articulated end, that
of attaining the truth.
The final portion of this standard required the judge to as-
sure that the interests of justice are best served when making
this discretionary decision. Again, the court did not enunciate
this exacting standard in its opinion; however, it did uphold the
lower court's decision because the interests of justice were best
served. The trial judge granted the prosecution's request for a
private conference to protect three prevailing interests of jus-
tice: 1) providing an opportunity for the prosecution to "rehabili-
tate" its case after a court officer's error potentially destroyed
it;306 2) preserving the defendant's right to confront the witness
testifying against him and his right to a fair trial;30 7 and 3) pre-
serving the jury's "authority to make informed determinations
as to fact and [witness] credibility."308
The safeguards employed by the trial judge in Branch suffi-
ciently ensured that the above interests were best served. The
judge informed the jury that the witness was removed so he
could speak with the prosecutor, intentionally omitting the con-
tention that the defendant's family threatened the witness.30 9
By limiting the jury's knowledge, the court assured that the de-
fendant was not prejudiced by the meeting. Similarly, the judge
cautioned the prosecutor against questioning the witness about
the change in testimony and instructed the witness not to tes-
tify about the change. 310
The judge also required that the contradictory statements
remain on the record, allowing the jury to consider both state-
304. Id.
305. Id. at 668, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
306. Id. at 667, 634 N.E.2d at 968, 612 N.Y.S.2d at 367.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
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ments when assessing the witness's credibility.311 Additionally,
by ensuring that both statements remained on the record, the
defense could utilize the contradiction to support its summation
argument-that the prosecutor improperly coached the
witness.
Finally, the defense was allowed to cross-examine the wit-
ness regarding the substance of the meeting.312 This protected
the rights of the defendant in two ways. First, this provided the
defense with the opportunity to bring any improprieties that oc-
curred during the meeting to the jury's attention. These impro-
prieties, once exposed, could be grounds for the judge to declare
a mistrial or could destroy the credibility of an important prose-
cution eye-witness. Second, the defense could use the cross-ex-
amination to formulate a detailed record for appeal. The court
allowed the defense to elicit any information it desired from the
witness. This unlimited cross-examination would be extremely
effective for developing a complete and detailed record.
V. Conclusion
After Branch, New York courts may be more inclined to al-
low midtestimony conferences between a non-defendant witness
and a prosecutor. The New York Court of Appeals has provided
new guidance in the area through the broad criteria upon which
it based its ruling. The court, however, refused to set down a
firm rule governing either the particular situation presented in
Branch, or any other specific circumstance. This refusal will al-
low trial judges, on a case-by-case basis, to properly use their
discretion to determine whether these midtestimony confer-
ences should be allowed.
Although the court could have used authority more directly
on point, the New York Court of Appeals correctly decided the
case before it. Allowing a midtestimony conference between the
prosecutor and a nonparty witness is a discretionary decision to
be made by the trial judge. The court did not establish a specific
311. People v. Branch, 83 N.Y.2d 663, 634 N.E.2d 966, 612 N.Y.S.2d 365
(1994).
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test for future courts to apply, but instead, framed broad crite-
ria which future courts should consider.
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